Seaman Status - Jones Act Seamen is defined by Maritime Case Law
Jones Act Seaman? Defined by Maritime Case Law
handris v. Latsis 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995).
U.S. Supreme Court
CHANDRIS, INC. v. LATSIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995)CHANDRIS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ANTONIOS LATSIS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE SECOND CIRCUIT
4-325.
Argued February 21, 1995Decided June 14, 1995
Respondent Latsis' duties as a superintendent engineer for petitioner Chandris, Inc., required him to takevoyages on Chandris' ships. He lost substantial vision in one eye after a condition that he developed while onone of those voyages went untreated by a ship's doctor. Following his recuperation, he sailed to Germany onthe S. S. Galileo and stayed with the ship while it was in drydock for refurbishment. Subsequently, he suedChandris for damages for his eye injury under the Jones Act, which provides a negligence cause of action for"any seaman" injured "in the course of his employment." The District Court instructed the jury that Latsiswas a "seaman" if he was permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial part of his work on, a vessel,but that the time Latsis spent with the Galileo while it was in drydock could not be considered because thevessel was then out of navigation. The jury returned a verdict for Chandris based solely on Latsis' seamanstatus. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, finding that the jury instruction improperly framed theissue primarily in terms of Latsis' temporal relationship to the vessel. It held that the "employment-relatedconnection to a vessel in navigation" required for seaman status under the Jones Act, McDermottInternational, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 , exists where an individual contributes to a vessel's functionor the accomplishment of its mission; the contribution is limited to a particular vessel or identifiable group ofvessels; the contribution is substantial in terms of its duration or nature; and the course of the individual'semployment regularly exposes him to the hazards of the sea. It also found that the District Court erred ininstructing the jury that the Galileo's drydock time could not count in the substantial connection equation.Page IIHeld:1. The "employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation" necessary for seaman status comprises twobasic elements: the worker's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment ofits mission, id., at 355, and the worker must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiablegroup of vessels) that is substantial in both its duration and its nature. Pp. 6-25.(a) The Jones Act provides heightened legal protections to seamen because of their exposure to the perils ofthe sea, but does not define the term "seaman." However, the Court's Jones Act cases establish the basicprinciples that the term does not include land-based workers, id., at 348, and that seaman status depends "noton the place where the injury is inflicted . . . but on the nature of the seaman's service, his status as amember of the vessel, and his relationship . . . to the vessel and its operation in navigable waters," Swanson v.Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4 . Thus, land-based maritime workers do not become seamen when theyhappen to be working aboard a vessel, and seamen do not lose Jones Act coverage when their service to avessel takes them ashore. Latsis' proposed "voyage test" - under which any maritime worker assigned to avessel for the duration of a voyage, whose duties contribute to the vessel's mission, would be a seaman forinjuries incurred during that voyage - conflicts with this status-based inquiry. Desper v. Starved Rock FerryCo., 342 U.S. 187, 190 , and Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co, 356 U.S. 252, 255 , distinguished. Pp. 6-16.(b) Beyond the basic themes outlined here, the Court's cases have been silent as to the precise relationship amaritime worker must bear to a vessel in order to come within the Jones Act's ambit, leaving the lowerfederal courts the task of developing appropriate criteria to distinguish "ship's company" from land-basedmaritime workers. Those courts generally require at least a significant connection to a vessel in navigation (orto an identifiable fleet of vessels) for a maritime worker to qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. Pp. 16-20.(c) The test for seaman status adopted here has two essential requirements. The first is a broad thresholdrequirement that makes all maritime employees who do the ship's work eligible for seaman status. Wilander,supra, at 355. The second requirement determines which of these eligible maritime employees have therequired employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation to make them in fact entitled to Jones Actbenefits. This requirement gives full effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and separatessea-based maritime employees entitled to Jones Act Page III protection from land-based workers whoseemployment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea. Who is a "member of a crew" is a mixedquestion of law and fact. A jury should be able to consider all relevant circumstances bearing on the tworequirements. The duration of a worker's connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker's activities,taken together, determine whether he is a seaman, because the ultimate inquiry is whether the worker is partof the vessel's crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.Although seaman status is not merely a temporal concept, it includes a temporal element. A worker whospends only a small fraction of his working time aboard a vessel is fundamentally land-based and thereforenot a crew member regardless of his duties. An appropriate rule of thumb is that a worker who spends lessthan about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman. Thisfigure is only a guideline that allows a court to take the question from the jury when a worker has a clearlyinadequate temporal connection to the vessel. On the other hand, the seaman status inquiry should not belimited exclusively to an examination of the overall course of a worker's service with a particular employer,since his seaman status may change with his basic assignment. Pp. 20-25.2. The District Court's drydock instruction was erroneous. Whether a vessel is in navigation is afact-intensive question that can be removed from the jury's consideration only where the facts and the law willreasonably support one conclusion. Based upon the record here, the trial court failed adequately to justify itsdecision to remove that question from the jury. Moreover, the court's charge to the jury swept too broadly inprohibiting the jury from considering the time Latsis spent with the vessel while in drydock for any purpose.Pp. 25-29.20 F.3d 45, affirmed.O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY,SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in whichTHOMAS and BREYER, JJ., joined. [ CHANDRIS, INC. v. LATSIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 1] Link to Supreme Court Opinion
CHANDRIS, INC. v. LATSIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995)CHANDRIS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ANTONIOS LATSIS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE SECOND CIRCUIT
4-325.
Argued February 21, 1995Decided June 14, 1995
Respondent Latsis' duties as a superintendent engineer for petitioner Chandris, Inc., required him to takevoyages on Chandris' ships. He lost substantial vision in one eye after a condition that he developed while onone of those voyages went untreated by a ship's doctor. Following his recuperation, he sailed to Germany onthe S. S. Galileo and stayed with the ship while it was in drydock for refurbishment. Subsequently, he suedChandris for damages for his eye injury under the Jones Act, which provides a negligence cause of action for"any seaman" injured "in the course of his employment." The District Court instructed the jury that Latsiswas a "seaman" if he was permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial part of his work on, a vessel,but that the time Latsis spent with the Galileo while it was in drydock could not be considered because thevessel was then out of navigation. The jury returned a verdict for Chandris based solely on Latsis' seamanstatus. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, finding that the jury instruction improperly framed theissue primarily in terms of Latsis' temporal relationship to the vessel. It held that the "employment-relatedconnection to a vessel in navigation" required for seaman status under the Jones Act, McDermottInternational, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 , exists where an individual contributes to a vessel's functionor the accomplishment of its mission; the contribution is limited to a particular vessel or identifiable group ofvessels; the contribution is substantial in terms of its duration or nature; and the course of the individual'semployment regularly exposes him to the hazards of the sea. It also found that the District Court erred ininstructing the jury that the Galileo's drydock time could not count in the substantial connection equation.Page IIHeld:1. The "employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation" necessary for seaman status comprises twobasic elements: the worker's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment ofits mission, id., at 355, and the worker must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiablegroup of vessels) that is substantial in both its duration and its nature. Pp. 6-25.(a) The Jones Act provides heightened legal protections to seamen because of their exposure to the perils ofthe sea, but does not define the term "seaman." However, the Court's Jones Act cases establish the basicprinciples that the term does not include land-based workers, id., at 348, and that seaman status depends "noton the place where the injury is inflicted . . . but on the nature of the seaman's service, his status as amember of the vessel, and his relationship . . . to the vessel and its operation in navigable waters," Swanson v.Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4 . Thus, land-based maritime workers do not become seamen when theyhappen to be working aboard a vessel, and seamen do not lose Jones Act coverage when their service to avessel takes them ashore. Latsis' proposed "voyage test" - under which any maritime worker assigned to avessel for the duration of a voyage, whose duties contribute to the vessel's mission, would be a seaman forinjuries incurred during that voyage - conflicts with this status-based inquiry. Desper v. Starved Rock FerryCo., 342 U.S. 187, 190 , and Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co, 356 U.S. 252, 255 , distinguished. Pp. 6-16.(b) Beyond the basic themes outlined here, the Court's cases have been silent as to the precise relationship amaritime worker must bear to a vessel in order to come within the Jones Act's ambit, leaving the lowerfederal courts the task of developing appropriate criteria to distinguish "ship's company" from land-basedmaritime workers. Those courts generally require at least a significant connection to a vessel in navigation (orto an identifiable fleet of vessels) for a maritime worker to qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. Pp. 16-20.(c) The test for seaman status adopted here has two essential requirements. The first is a broad thresholdrequirement that makes all maritime employees who do the ship's work eligible for seaman status. Wilander,supra, at 355. The second requirement determines which of these eligible maritime employees have therequired employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation to make them in fact entitled to Jones Actbenefits. This requirement gives full effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and separatessea-based maritime employees entitled to Jones Act Page III protection from land-based workers whoseemployment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea. Who is a "member of a crew" is a mixedquestion of law and fact. A jury should be able to consider all relevant circumstances bearing on the tworequirements. The duration of a worker's connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker's activities,taken together, determine whether he is a seaman, because the ultimate inquiry is whether the worker is partof the vessel's crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.Although seaman status is not merely a temporal concept, it includes a temporal element. A worker whospends only a small fraction of his working time aboard a vessel is fundamentally land-based and thereforenot a crew member regardless of his duties. An appropriate rule of thumb is that a worker who spends lessthan about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman. Thisfigure is only a guideline that allows a court to take the question from the jury when a worker has a clearlyinadequate temporal connection to the vessel. On the other hand, the seaman status inquiry should not belimited exclusively to an examination of the overall course of a worker's service with a particular employer,since his seaman status may change with his basic assignment. Pp. 20-25.2. The District Court's drydock instruction was erroneous. Whether a vessel is in navigation is afact-intensive question that can be removed from the jury's consideration only where the facts and the law willreasonably support one conclusion. Based upon the record here, the trial court failed adequately to justify itsdecision to remove that question from the jury. Moreover, the court's charge to the jury swept too broadly inprohibiting the jury from considering the time Latsis spent with the vessel while in drydock for any purpose.Pp. 25-29.20 F.3d 45, affirmed.O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY,SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in whichTHOMAS and BREYER, JJ., joined. [ CHANDRIS, INC. v. LATSIS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 1] Link to Supreme Court Opinion